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Abstract 
 
The early warning mechanism represents an opportunity for building new and direct 
relationships between regional councils and the national parliament, which to date have 
been substantially lacking in Italy. Relying on the provision of Art. 6 of Protocol no 2 
annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, the new law on the participation of Italy in EU affairs 
provides, for the first time, a bottom-up process of transmission of regional opinions (also 
from the regional executives, by means of a ‘political dialogue’) to the Italian parliament, 
thus indirectly also enhancing the ties between the regional and national levels of 
government. 
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1. Foreword: Is there a shift from the European to an Italian ‘regional 
blindness’, after the Treaty of  Lisbon? 
 
The European Community (EC) has often been accused of remaining ‘blind’ towards 
the territorial organization of its federal and regional Member States (Ipsen 1966; D’Atena 
1998; Weatherill 2005a; Borońska-Hryniewieka 2013).I However, the traditional EC 
indifference for the constitutional structure of Member States has been gradually 
attenuated and, with the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, 
it seems that it has almost disappeared from the European Union (EU).II 
The ‘regional blindness’ started to be effectively overcome since the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1993), when the principle of subsidiarityIII was introduced into EC primary law 
with regard to non exclusive competences (ex multis, Toth 1992: 1072-1105; Massa Pinto 
2003; Ippolito 2007) and when the Committee of the Regions, as an EC advisory body 
entitled to territorial representation at EC level, was established (Loughlin 1996: 141-162; 
Iurato 2006: 679-710). Other significant steps towards the acknowledgement of the 
regional dimension of the EU have been: the strengthening of EU cohesion policy 
(Martinico 2013); the White Paper of the European Commission on European Governance 
(COM(2001)428) and the launch of wide-ranging consultations among sub-national actors 
on European dossiers and draft legislative acts (Plutino 2003: 61-94; Groppi 2007: 155-
214); the acknowledgment of the locus standi of regions before the Court of Justice in matter 
of state aids (Porchia 1999: 1674-1680; Caruso 2011: 804-827; Raspadori 2012: 69-72);IV 
and, finally, the Laeken Declaration that put the territorial question firmly within the 
agenda of the Convention on the Future of Europe (Loughlin 2005; Weatherill 2005b; 
Kiiver 2006; Domenichelli, 2007). 
The Treaty of Lisbon substantially extinguished the problem of ‘regional blindness’, at 
least legally speaking. This Treaty touches upon the regional issue through four groups of 
provisions: firstly, the constitutional identity of Member States, which must be taken into 
account by EU institutions when acting, by referring to ‘their fundamental structure, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’ (Article 4(2) TEU) (Di 
Salvatore 2008; Guastaferro 2012: 305-318); secondly, the principle of subsidiarity has been 
restyled (Article 5(3) TEU) in order to assess whether the objectives of a proposed action 
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can be sufficiently achieved at regional and local level (Schütze 2009: 525-536); thirdly, as 
an expansion of the duty of the European Commission to launch wide-ranging 
consultations before any draft legislative act is proposed (Article 2, Protocol no. 2), also 
regions, although not directly mentioned, can have a say at the pre-legislative stage (Morelli 
2011: 109-124; Fasone and Lupo: 2013); and, finally, regions are enabled to control the 
compliance of draft legislative acts with the principle of subsidiarity (Articles 6 and 8, 
Protocol no. 2). 
Regions have become the guardians of the principle of subsidiarity by means of two 
procedures (Bußjäger 2010: 51-71). On the one hand, ‘regional parliaments with legislative power’ 
(Article 6) can be consulted by the relevant national legislature as part of the early warning 
mechanism, that is during the eight-week period when parliaments can address reasoned – 
i.e. negative – opinions to the EU institutions claiming a breach of the principle of 
subsidiarity before the beginning of the legislative process; provided certain thresholds are 
reached, that can lead to a delay or even to a locking of the process (Article 7).V On the 
other hand (Article 8), the Committee of the Regions can now bring an action for 
annulment before the Court of Justice when a legislative act is deemed to be adopted in 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity (Porchia 2009: 223-232; Piattoni 2012: 59-73). 
In particular, the involvement of regional parliaments with legislative powers in the 
early warning mechanism, although indirectly (through the national parliaments) can be 
welcomed as a ‘revolutionary’ result. In fact, this new provision not only requires the 
participation of regions in a euro-national procedure, but also imposes that regions will be 
consulted at parliamentary level. In other words, the EU makes a clear option for a regional 
institution, the regional legislature, to be involved. This norm marks a sort of abandonment 
of the EU’s ‘regional blindness’ and also sanctions the rise of an EU interest in the 
institutional dimension and form of government of regions with legislative powers. 
Moreover, the EU has reached the point to shape directly the inter-institutional 
relations between levels of government within the Member States. By asking national 
parliaments to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments in the early warning 
mechanism, Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 has made the consultation of regional legislatures 
compulsory whenever a draft legislative act (or an EU document) falls within the regional 
remit (Álvarez Conde 2006: 51 ff.; Fasone 2009). Thus a European obligation to introduce 
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a procedure linking regional and national parliaments in the early warning mechanism 
seems to exist after the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Starting from this assumption, this essay aims at analyzing how the Italian legal system 
has regulated and, if so, enforced this new inter-institutional and multilevel procedure 
shaped by Article 6 of Protocol no. 2. In this regard, Italy seems an interesting case study, 
given the lack of any official form of involvement of regional councils in the activity and 
procedures of the national parliament, with very few exceptions (see section 2). Because of 
this institutional and constitutional constraint, this essay argues that the procedure 
provided by the Treaty of Lisbon could affect the relationship between the regional and 
national levels of government in Italy and foster a brand new form of cooperation amongst 
legislatures – one which the Italian parliament itself has not been able to design or reform 
over the last ten years. In fact, compared to the results achieved by the EU, the state level 
in Italy has shown itself to be affected by a two-tier ‘regional blindness’. First of all 
internally because, in spite of some failed attempts, no direct relationships between the 
Italian parliament and regional councils have been established after the constitutional 
reform of 2001, nor have the relevant provisions of Constitutional Law no. 3/2001 been 
implemented to this purpose. Therefore regions are either substantially kept apart from the 
decision-making processes of the national parliament or, instead, can intervene indirectly 
through their regional executives as part of the inter-governmental State-Regions 
Conference, which is consulted on most parliamentary bills. Secondly, the Italian ‘regional 
blindness’ emerges with regard to the participation of regions in the national procedures 
dealing with EU affairs. Here the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, in particular that on the involvement of regional councils based on Article 6, took a 
long time before it was regulated (see Law no. 234/2012, finally passed on 27 November 
2012). Nor does it not seem that at the national level, particularly within the executive, 
there is awareness about the difference, legally speaking and in practice, to be made for the 
participation of regional institutions – governments or councils – in EU affairs at national 
level. Apparently the EU has thus become more conscious than some Member States of 
the inherent distinction, as regards the nature of institutions and the scope of their 
involvement, between different forms of regional participation in Euro-national 
procedures. By contrast, the quality and the significance of involving regional councils, the 
directly elected legislatures acting most closely to citizens and representing also political 
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minorities, rather than simply regional governments, is worth mentioning, since Article 6 of 
Protocol no. 2 does not refer to ‘regional parliaments’ by chance (section 3). 
The essay is structured as follows: after a very brief overview of (or, rather, the lack of) 
the tools of cooperation between the Italian national parliament and the regional councils, 
the relationship between the Italian legislatures on EU affairs is examined in light of the 
provisions in force before, only recently, a new Law entered into force. Then, the content 
of this Law no. 234/2012 is analysed, focusing in particular on the early warning 
mechanism and on its collateral procedures. Finally, before the conclusion, a few 
observations on the prospects for strengthening the relationship between the national 
parliament and the regional councils are presented. 
 
2. Brief  introduction to a complicated story: on the relationship 
between State and regional legislatures in the Italian constitutional 
system 
 
The relationship between the national parliament and the regional councils in Italy has 
always been quite weak (Manzella 2003: 19-20). Contrary to what happens in other 
decentralized EU Member States, for example in Austria or in Germany, the Italian regions 
are not represented in a national second chamber, neither at executive nor at parliamentary 
level.  
The delayed establishment of the regions,VI in the 1970s, when the (renewed) Italian 
parliament had already functioned for more than twenty years, and the limited legislative 
competences initially attributed to the regional councils, have not favoured the creation of 
an inter-institutional cooperation between the regional and national legislatures. The idea of 
establishing a Senate of the Regions has recurred several times throughout the Italian 
Republican history,VII in particular after the revision of Title V of the Constitution (Const. 
Law no. 3/2001), in 2001, when the legislative competences of the regions have been 
significantly extended and their exercise has become more autonomous from the control of 
the State (Article 117, sect. 3 and 4 Const.) (ex multis, Martines et al 2008).VIII 
The persistent failure of setting up a Senate of the Regions and the weakening of 
regional councils following the reform of regional statutes and forms of government from 
1999 onwards (Olivetti 2002: 308-310) have made the cooperation between the State and 
regions a matter for inter-governmental relations only (Ruggiu 2006; Rivosecchi 2010; and 
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Griglio in this Issue). Thus this cooperation has been modeled on conferences that bring 
together representatives of the State and of regional governments (as well as of local self-
government, depending on the issue at stake), although some tools of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation have been provided in the renewed constitutional framework. 
Possibly the most significant example consisted (and still consists) in the provisions of 
Constitutional Law no. 3/2001 that require to complement the parliamentary Committee 
on Regional Affairs (Article 11), which is a bicameral committee usually exercising advisory 
powers (Article 126 Const.), through representatives of the regions (and of local units of 
self-government), to be chosen at ‘parliamentary level’, either from within the regional 
council or appointed by them (Gianfrancesco 2004: 111 ff; Bifulco 2007: 88 ff.; Lupo 2007: 
357 ff; Mangiameli 2007: 111 ff.). Article 11, which also increases the powers of this 
Committee since its opinions on certain issues would have become somewhat binding for 
the committee responsible on the subject matter, has never been enforced. Although this 
was a provisional solution waiting for a more comprehensive constitutional revision, the 
rules of procedure of the two Chambers have not been amended so far. Amendments 
would have been particularly crucial, given the difficult coordination between national and 
regional legislators in the aftermath of the 2001 revision and the confusing situation arising 
from the new division of legislative competences. Thus it is exactly after 2001 that the first 
level of ‘regional blindness’ of the state has become exacerbated: the Italian Parliament 
refrained from taking any action for bridging the gap between national and regional 
legislators and often kept on legislating as if the constitutional amendments had not been 
approved (D’Andrea 2002: 253 ff.; Rosa 2003: 54). 
Until recently a sort of apathy has characterised the attitude of the Italian Parliament 
towards the regional councils and their new competences. In addition to the lack of 
commitment to modify the composition of the bicameral Committee on Regional Affairs, 
not even the ‘jurisdictions’ (i.e. the subject matters) of the standing committees have been 
updated and reformed to accommodate the expansion of the regional legislative 
competences and the simultaneous restriction of the State ones (Midiri 2007: 123-140). 
Likewise, some outdated provisions of the parliamentary rules of procedure stemming 
from the pre-2001 constitutional setting, like those on parliamentary approval of regional 
statutes or on the parliamentary control of regional laws on the ground of the merit 
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(Paladin 1957: 623-666; Gianfrancesco 1994), have not been repealed yet – more than ten 
years after the constitutional revision. 
Apart from some minor legislative provisions, like those of Law no. 42/2009 on the 
bicameral Committee on the Enforcement of Fiscal Federalism (Lupo 2009), which 
however have not changed the landscape of the relationship between regional councils and 
the parliament, until 2012 only two formal and official channels of cooperation have 
effectively been in force, the others being informal tools not provided by law. These two 
officials channels are regional initiatives of national bills and the so-called ‘votes’ of the 
regional councils. However, while the former show a low degree of success in spite of a 
certain regional activism,IX the latter are likely to experience a sort of ‘revival’. Indeed, these 
‘votes’, which are provided only by the Rules of the Senate (Article 138), are petitions or 
contributions submitted by regional councils to the Senate on issues of their interest. These 
are then examined by the competent standing committee, possibly jointly with a bill dealing 
with the same subject-matter, if existing. The number of such ‘votes’ has increased since 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon because, lacking any other provision that could 
regulate the participation of regional councils in the early warning mechanism (see above, 
section 1), regional legislatures have started to transmit their opinions and observations in 
particular to the Senate by means of this pre-existing tool. 
Moreover, also informal instruments of cooperation have increasingly been used in the 
last few years, such as hearings of regional councilors before national parliamentary 
committees, even though they take place in the same way as hearings of interest groups, i.e. 
without any explicit recognition of the constitutional status of regional councils, in 
particular with regard to their relationship with parliament. Finally, in order to compensate 
for the lack of a Senate of the Regions, by means of an inter-institutional agreement of 28 
June 2007 between the Presidents of the Chambers of the Italian Parliament and the 
Coordinator of the Conference of the Presidents of Regional Councils, a Joint Committee 
composed of an equal number of deputies, senators and regional councilors, plus the 
President of the parliamentary Committee on Regional Affairs, has been established. This 
Joint Committee, which is the result of an informal process of cooperation that had started 
in 2002 as a joint working group, saw its composition and functions enlarged in 2009, but it 
has been rarely summoned to date. Indeed, in order to organize a meeting – to which also 
Italian members of the European Parliament can be invited – of this Joint Committee the 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
130 
activities of several assemblies have to be coordinated and outcomes of such meetings 
suffer from an uncertain legal status and effectiveness. 
Given the weakness of existing cooperation between Parliament and regional councils 
in terms both of legal and more informal instruments, the Treaty of Lisbon and in 
particular Protocol no. 2 can probably bring new blood to this exhausted relationship. In 
other words, the early warning mechanism, by imposing a direct dialogue among the 
legislatures of the Member States, could be the starting point to reshape such a relationship 
beyond the ‘borders’ of a mere coordinated participation in EU affairs and to counteract 
the first level of the state’s ‘regional blindness’. 
 
3. The relationship between the Italian Parliament and the regional 
councils on EU affairs before Law no. 234/2012 
 
The second level of ‘regional blindness’ of the Italian state affects regional participation 
in the EU decision-making and consists of two dimension. The first deals with the fact that 
national bodies have perceived the involvement of regions in national procedures related to 
EU matters as a burden, instead of taking advantage of it as a further source of legitimation 
for their national position, which should arise from the accommodation of different points 
of view, including regional ones. The second dimension of ‘blindness’, which anyway is 
connected to the first, stems from the age-old assumption that regions must be considered 
as parts of a unitary approach towards EU affairs, thus not only disregarding regional 
diversities, but also neglecting that regional councils and governments can play a 
distinctive, though coordinated, role in EU affairs. 
As pointed out by many scholars (Pérez Tremps 1991: 93-110; Berti 2002: 9-20; 
Antonelli 2010: 246-247), as a general trend of the process of EU integration the role of 
executives, both at national and supranational levels, has been strongly reinforced whereas 
national legislatures have been weakened (Cartabia 2007: 1081-1104; Spadacini 2007: 353-
430; Girotto 2009: 95-100). Because of the progressive conferral of more and more 
competences to the EU, legislatures have been deprived, with their consent, of the power 
to regulate many issues that once fell under the ‘jurisdiction’ of Member States. This has 
caused a sort of competition between legislatures located at different levels aiming to 
preserve their legislative powers (Zuddas 2010). 
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However, the revision of Title V of the Italian Constitution in 2001 provided a broader 
room for manoeuvre for regional legislatures compared to the past and simultaneously 
enhanced their position in the ‘preparatory decision-making process of EU legislative acts’ 
and in the implementation of EU measures (Article 117, sect. 5 Const.), provided the areas 
concerned fall within their responsibility and subject to the rules set out in state law. Thus 
these new provisions seem to run in favour of a more active involvement of the regions 
and possibly of the regional councils, both in the preparatory stage, which deals with law-
making, and in the execution of EU obligations, which often requires adaptation by means 
of legislation (Plutino 2003: 61-94; Paterniti 2012: 51-79). 
However, although it allows regions to take part in EU policy-making also on behalf of 
the Italian Republic and in the place of the State, here the Constitution does not identify 
the regional body or bodies entitled to step in this procedure. In fact, two new ordinary 
laws approved in the aftermath of the constitutional revision, Law no. 131/2003 and Law 
no. 11/2005, seem to further strengthen the position of regional executives in EU affairs 
(in principle, since some provisions have remained unenforced),X individually and through 
their Conferences (Bilancia et al: 2010: 140 ff.), and, what is more important for the aim of 
this contribution, avoid the creation of any mechanism of direct cooperation between 
parliament and the regional councils. The only provision establishing a sort of coordination 
between the legislatures of the two levels of government concerns the implementation of 
EU obligations and, in particular, in matters of shared competences (Article 117, sect. 3), 
the setting of fundamental principles of legislation to be developed by the State and then 
specified by the regions – namely by the regional councils (Cartabia and Violini 2005: 475-
512). 
By contrast, according to Article 5 of Law no. 11/2005, regional councils, like regional 
executives, enjoye a direct relationship only with the State government, particularly with the 
Department on EC (then EU) policies. Indeed, the State government transmitted and still 
transmits all EU draft legislative acts and documents also to regional councils, by means of 
the Conference of their Presidents (see above, section 2). In turn, within twenty days 
regional councils submit their observations to the Department on EC policies. The Italian 
Parliament has remained excluded from this cycle of top-down and then bottom-up 
interaction between regions and the State government. 
The lack of any direct relationship between parliament and regional legislatures has 
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appeared to be even more serious after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, which in 
Italy was done unanimously already in 2008. From then and until the end of 2012, passing 
through the entry into force of the Treaty in 2009, no change has occurred with regard to 
the direct cooperation between the parliament and the regional councils on EU matters 
(neither in other fields) in terms of national legislation – i.e. no amendments to State laws 
or the parliamentary Rules of procedure took place (Bifulco 2012: 10 ff.). 
Although Law no. 11/2005 was amended in several provisions in order to guarantee 
the transmission of a broader flow of information from the government to the parliament 
and to regulate its involvement in the early warning mechanism (while postponing until 
Law no. 234/2012 the effective enforcement of the other Treaty provisions concerning the 
national parliament), no mention of the regional councils was made. In the light of Article 
6 of Protocol no 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (see above, section 1), the lack of any 
reference to regional legislatures and to their mandatory consultation by parliament 
appeared very ambiguous, above all because a brand new article, Article 4-quater, was 
introduced ad hoc on the early warning mechanism.  
Rather, regional councils have only indirectly benefited from the strengthening of 
parliament’s position as regards the executive’s duty of information, thus also receiving the 
government’s Annual Report and ProgrammeXI about, on the one hand, prospective 
actions of the Republic in the EU and, on the other, the implementation of EU obligations, 
the outcomes of the Italian participation in the meetings of EU institutions, and the follow 
up of parliamentary resolutions and regional observations (Article 15, Law no. 11/2005).XII 
Although the two Chambers, in particular the Chamber of Deputies expressly,XIII have 
recognised the need to adjust their Rules towards establishing direct contacts with regional 
councils regarding their consultation during the early warning mechanism, neither have 
their Rules of procedure been reformed to date nor has the involvement of regional 
legislatures been provided for in the new experimental and temporary procedures fixed 
through two decisions by the Committee on Rules of the Chamber and in a letter of the 
President of the Senate.XIV 
Nevertheless, if until 2012 both the Italian parliament and government have 
substantially ignored the regional dimension of the Treaty of Lisbon – confirming, once 
more, the thesis of the ‘regional blindness’ of Italy – regions, and particularly regional 
councils, have shown a great commitment to revise their own statutes, laws and rules of 
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procedure. In other words, regional councils have succeeded where the State has failed, 
with most of them adopting updated rules even before the Treaty of Lisbon entry into 
force. To date all the regional councils, with only few exceptions,XV have adopted new rules 
allowing them, in principle, to take part in the early warning mechanism, although 
parliament has not approved symmetrical provisions. 
Indeed, in spite of the absence of legal provisions at national level, the cooperation 
between regional councils and the two chambers in the early warning mechanism has de 
facto started to develop intensively ever since the 16th parliamentary term (2008-2013) 
(Olivetti 2012: 551-552). Some regional legislatures, especially those of Abruzzo, Emilia-
Romagna and Marche (Sardella 2007: 431-477; Voltan 2010: 135:141), have begun to 
transmit their observations to both chambers on the basis on the combined provisions of 
Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 with Articles 4-quarter and 5 of Law no. 5/2005: in fact, in the 
observations regional councils inserted not only their assessment on the compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity, but also their concerns about the principle of proportionality 
and on the substance of draft legislative acts and documents. Albeit initially these 
observations have been ignored, since the Chamber and the Senate do not even known 
how to deal with them, by which existing procedures, and how to catalogue them, the 
situation later has changed. Already in 2009 the Regional Assembly of Emilia-Romagna 
submitted its observations to the parliament on a draft Directive concerning the 
application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and, subsequently, because of the 
regional competence on the matter, the Chairman of the Committee on Budget, General 
and Institutional Affairs of this Regional Assembly was heard before the Committee on 
EU Policies of the Chamber of Deputies.XVI 
Later on this inter-parliamentary relationship has developed further into institutional 
practice, given the fact that the flow of observations from regional legislatures to 
parliament has constantly grown. The Senate has revitalized the procedure on the ‘votes’ of 
regional councils (see above, section 2) treating regional observations under the early 
warning mechanism as if they were votes and starting to inform the regional legislatures, by 
means of the Conference of their Presidents, on EU draft legislative acts and documents to 
be examined by the Senate, whatever the competence affected (national or regional) and 
before the deadline of eight weeks has expired (Capuano 2011: 519-550). 
Even though the deadline has almost never been respected, which in the end is 
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important in terms of the effectiveness of the whole early warning mechanism carried out 
at national level, the cooperation amongst legislatures has led to unexpected results, given 
the lack of legal guarantees in the national legislation. Since 2012 the standing committees 
of the Senate responsible on the subject matter, when examining within the early warning 
mechanism EU draft legislative acts falling within regional competences and on which 
regional observations had been submitted, have publicly acknowledged the contributions 
sent by regional councils and cited them in their resolutions that are also the acts where 
possibly a reasoned opinion is expressed, according to Protocol no. 2. Moreover, by way of 
the Conference of their Presidents, regional councils have developed an enhanced 
cooperation amongst themselves,XVII starting to agree, whenever possible, on a common 
and unitary position to be submitted to parliament. Therefore both the single submission 
by each regional council and the collective position that they express are examined by the 
national legislature.XVIII An interesting case was that of the common position adopted on 16 
December 2011 by the Conference of the Presidents of Regional Councils, on the input of 
the regional councils of Calabria, Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Sardegna and Veneto, on the 
EU legislative package dealing with the reform of the cohesion policy and of the common 
agricultural policy for 2014–2020, later cited by the Senate in its resolution.XIX 
Although these developments by means of institutional practice have not at all solved 
the problem of ‘regional blindness’ by the State as regards participation in EU affairs, they 
demonstrate an active engagement by regional councils in the early warning mechanism 
and have produced one of the most dedicated attempt on the part of the regions to create a 
direct and stable cooperation with parliament. 
 
4. Is Law no. 234/2012 a turning point? Lights and shadows for 
Regional Councils 
 
Institutional practice alone is not able to ensure the effective enforcement of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and of the early warning mechanism and Article 4-quater, which only refers to 
parliament (Capuano 2011), must be complemented by provisions that consider also 
regional legislatures otherwise marginalized in breach of the Treaty itself. In the other 
Member States where all the regions are provided with legislative powers (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain and the UK) this issue has been already addressed, sometimes after long 
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and complicated negotiations, such as in Belgium (Popelier and Vandenbruwaene 2011: 
204-228), while in others it has been a priority to maintain the participation of the 
executives of the Länder in EU affairs (Müller 2010: 75-96). 
Following a cumbersome iter legis that began in 2010, originating from several 
parliamentary bills then merged with a government bill and overcoming the change of the 
parliamentary majority and of the executive in November 2011, on 27 November 2012 
finally Law no. 234/2012 was approved. It entirely repealed Law no. 11/2005 and indeed 
contains many innovative provisions (Esposito 2013: 14 ff.). Most of all, Law no. 234/2012 
introduces, for the first time, into ordinary legislation a direct form of cooperation, that is a 
channel of inter-institutional relations,XX between the parliament and regional councils that 
is compulsory according to EU obligations. The fact that such an obligation arises from 
outside the nation-state, i.e. from a Treaty provision, possibly limits the risk of repeating 
unsuccessful experiences like that of Article 11 of Const. Law no. 3/2001 on the 
parliamentary Committee on Regional Affairs. 
 
4.1. The early warning mechanism 
The participation of the Italian ‘regional parliaments with legislative powers’ or, rather, 
according to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (Lupo 2002: 1209-1224),XXI of 
regional councils or assemblies, in the early warning mechanism is now provided by Article 
8, section 3, and Article 25 of Law no. 234/2012. The former takes the perspective of the 
Italian Parliament, locating the consultation of regional councils within the national 
parliamentary scrutiny of subsidiarity, while the latter considers it from the standpoint of 
the regions and thus constitutes the ‘legal basis’ for the submission of observations on the 
subsidiarity principle by the assemblies to parliament. This is reflected also in the location 
of Article 8 within Title II that deals with the participation of parliament in the formation 
of the Italian position on EU policies and in EU decision-making, and of Article 25 within 
Title IV that instead deals with the participation of regions and local self-government in 
EU law-making.  
The option to split the regulation of a unitary procedure, as it is conceived by Article 6 
of Protocol no. 2, into two articles, however, either appears as a duplication or remains 
unclear at first sight. The early warning mechanism is, in fact, a procedure where all the 
players involved at either the national or the supranational level interact repeatedly, in 
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particular those located inside the same Member State, i.e. the national and regional 
parliaments. However, analysing the two articles more in depth, it appears that the ratio 
behind them is the guarantee a real participation of regional councils in this process. 
Since Article 8, section 3, which follows the provisions on the adoption of reasoned 
opinions by parliament, states that the two Chambers can (‘possono’), and not shall, consult 
the regional councils in compliance with Protocol no. 2, the carrying out of an effective 
consultation does not seem to be ensured in any case. Instead it results from the 
discretionary choice of each Chamber, this being an individual prerogative of each branch 
of parliament. For example, in principle the Senate could proceed to consult regional 
legislatures, whereas the Chamber does not. Moreover, if shaped within the format of a 
request of opinions to the presidents of the 20 regional councils (plus the councils of the 
two autonomous provinces), the consultation could become quite complex, although an 
alternative would be to address such a request of opinions to the Coordinator of the 
Conference of Presidents of regional councils. Even more cumbersome is the hypothesis 
of summoning a bargaining table (‘tavolo negoziale’) among all the legislatures concerned 
aimed at making the consultation effective. 
However, in order to prevent any possible hurdle that could discourage parliament 
from undertaking this consultation, as a precaution Article 25 entitles regional councils to 
directly submit to Parliament, either upon its request or not, their observations on the 
principle of subsidiarity in due time for the conclusion of the parliamentary scrutiny within 
the eight-week deadline. Therefore, Article 25 ensures that the positions adopted by the 
regional legislatures are taken into account by the two chambers. In other words, a sort of 
‘double-flow’ procedure is established: whenever the top-down consultation is not 
accomplished, a bottom-up flow of observations emanating from the regional councils can 
reach the parliament anyway. This contributes to the prospects of creating a long-term 
cooperation among the legislatures. 
This procedure reveals another advantage of regional legislatures, as the submission of 
their observations under the early warning mechanism is not constrained by a rigid division 
of competences between regions and State. If regional councils would have been allowed 
to express their positions only upon the summoning of a consultation on the part of each 
chamber, then it would have been likely that such consultation was arranged only with 
regard to draft legislative acts falling within the regional remit. By contrast, the wording of 
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Article 25 guarantees that regional councils can transmit observations on the principle of 
subsidiarity within the national stage of the early warning mechanism also on EU proposals 
that primarily affect state competences: examples are EU draft legislative acts concerning 
immigration which have a deep impact also on the regions (e.g. on health care or social 
services), although according to Article 117, section 2, lit. b), immigration formally is a 
State competence. 
In light of the above, the institutional practice already followed by parliament and 
regional councils is confirmed. However, the fact that now this practice has been codified 
into ordinary legislation should not be underestimated. The mere behavior of institutional 
actors – like national legislatures – or the attempt to connect their conduct to existing 
general rules of procedure or to ‘experimental and provisional procedures’ – which would 
imply stretching parliamentary rules beyond their scope – aiming at regulating a completely 
new subject-matter (the idea of a direct relationship between parliament and European 
institutions or between parliament and regional councils on EU affairs has never been 
contemplated before the Treaty of Lisbon) do not enjoy the same degree of legal certainty 
accorded to an ordinary law, nor do they appear as fully correct from a legal point of view. 
Therefore it can be questionably argued that the provisions of Law no. 324/2012 on the 
early warning mechanism are devoid of autonomous legal value (Esposito 2013: 48).XXII On 
the contrary, they provide, for the first time, a national legal basis for the effective 
implementation of the early warning mechanism that takes into account not only the 
parliament (as in the former Article 4-quarter) but also regional legislatures, as provided by 
Protocol no. 2. 
Nor can the thesis be supported according to which the provisions of EU Treaties and 
Protocols are sufficient to enforce the new mechanism at national level (Capuano 2011). 
To some extent these European provisions need to be ‘nationalised’, according to the 
constitutional and institutional identity and the parliamentary tradition of each Member 
State. The EU only establishes a minimum common standard for the early warning 
mechanism, in order to leave room for manoeuvre to Member States, which, for example, 
are free to make the effects of the consultation of regional legislatures more or less binding 
as well as to define further conditions.  
Law no. 234/2012 has somewhat abdicated from this function with regard to the role 
of regional legislatures in the early warning mechanism and this is why Article 8, section 3, 
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has been depicted in the literature as a ‘programmatic rule’ (norma programmatica) (Esposito 
2013: 48). Indeed it fails to define the duty of the parliament with regard to effects and 
frequency – i.e. when such a consultation must occur – of regional consultation, simply 
referring to the rules of procedure for a detailed regulation of the matter. While according 
to Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 national Parliaments seem to be bound to consult their 
regional legislatures when the issue at stake affects regional competences, quite 
understandably EU provisions have not fixed any further obligations for national 
parliamentary procedures. Indeed, this matter should be regulated either by means of 
constitutional law – as it was done in 2001 regarding the participation of regions in the 
Committee on Regional Affairs –, since it concerns the relationship between parliamentary 
institutions enjoying a constitutional status and located at different levels of government 
within the Italian Republic or, as it seems preferable, by means of ordinary legislation. In 
the end, it would not be the first time that an ordinary law defines in great detail the effects 
of parliamentary procedures or the activity of parliamentary bodies (see, e.g., Law no. 
124/2007 and Law no. 42/2009), nor can such legislation be deemed to impair the 
autonomy of parliament. By contrast, much less can be done through the rules of each 
chamber because the whole process concerns a national multi-level and inter-institutional 
procedure and there exists the risk to undermine the prerogatives conferred by the Treaty 
of Lisbon upon regional legislatures. What parliamentary rules of procedure could 
rationally establish, instead, are certain procedural but equally fundamental aspects, like the 
introduction of the ‘votes’ of regional councils also in the Chamber and formal and 
televised hearings of regional councilors during the early warning mechanism or to regulate 
the status of regional ‘votes’ within the parliamentary scrutiny on subsidiarity (which 
committee is entitled to examine them, whether they are annexed to the opinions or to the 
reasoned opinions, etc.). 
As much as Article 8, also Article 25 remains deliberately silent on certain issues. For 
example, it is worth mentioning the lack of a further deadline for the transmission of the 
observations on the part of regional councils. This seems consistent with the fact that the 
main deadline has already been fixed, for everybody, in the eight weeks laid down by 
Protocol no. 2 itself. However, mentioning as the only time limit for regional legislatures 
the submission ‘in due time as for the conclusion of the parliamentary scrutiny’ (thus 
within the eight-week period), the provision remains too vague. Indeed, practice reveals 
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that whenever one or both chambers are able to send their opinions or reasoned opinions 
in advance (sometimes they do not, and thus this case falls into the category of the 
‘political dialogue’, see section 4.2.),XXIII they do not wait for the submission of regional 
observations until the expiration of deadline. Instead, as soon as the opinion is supposed to 
be finalized, it is voted by the committee concerned or by the House and immediately 
transmitted to the EU institutions and the executive. Article 25 does not prevent such a 
hypothesis from happening. In other words, what ‘due time’ means is likely to be decided 
by the parliament every time (20, 30, 40 days), thus giving it great discretion and damaging 
the predictability of the whole procedure.  
Moreover, relying on the rules of procedure (Articles 125 R.C. and 144 R.S.) and on the 
experimental procedures in force, the time limit also differs from one chamber to the other 
(40 days, 15 days etc.). Not only would a fixed deadline give legal certainty to the 
procedure, stimulating more promptly a reaction on the part of regional councils, but it 
would also solve a possible mismatch which could occur with regard to the deadline of 30 
days, fixed in Article 24 and concerning the submission of regional observations, either by 
legislatures or executives, to the State government. The content of these latter observations 
is not clarified by the Law, but in principle they should not deal with the principle of 
subsidiarity in order to avoid overlapping with Article 25.  
Law no. 234/2012 does not solve the problem, which has existed since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, of coordinating multiple procedures involving the same 
players, i.e. the regional councils, and dealing with the same subject, i.e. an identical EU 
draft legislative act, but having different:  
- recipients at national level, i.e. government and parliament;  
- scopes, i.e. issues arising from the proposal or the principle of subsidiarity (or, within 
the ‘political dialogue’, any other issue); and 
- deadlines, i.e. eight weeks, 30 days or the undefined parliamentary schedule, to be 
fixed for each draft legislative act. 
With regards to the problem of accommodating the early warning mechanism, which 
by definition is a parliament-based procedure, with the relationship between regions – 
regional councils included – and the State government, provided by Article 24, Law no. 
234/2012 fails to establish an additional but autonomous flow of information from 
parliament to the regional legislatures or to their Conference (as it is developing in practice: 
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see above, section 3).XXIV In fact, if the government is possibly the best institution to 
provide also regional councils with specialized and timely information on EU draft 
legislative acts (Article 24, section 2), nonetheless the State legislature seems the most 
appropriate institution for sending draft legislative acts to regional councils and to fix, at 
the same time, the deadline for the early warning mechanism.XXV 
However, in contrast to this criticism emerging from the analysis of Articles 8 and 25, a 
positive element deriving from the new provisions deals with a clarification of the 
relationship within the ‘triangle’ identified by parliament, regional councils and the 
Conference of their presidents. Here Article 25 opts for setting up individual relationships 
between each regional legislature and parliament within the early warning mechanism, a 
choice which mirrors that of the EU Treaties for an individual participation of every 
parliament or chamber thereof, without however excluding the exchange of views and 
coordination amongst parliaments (Louis 2009: 131 ff).  
The ratio is the following and seconds the asymmetry of Italian regionalism (Bilancia et 
al. 2010: 124): in fact, a different degree of commitment and engagement can emerge 
across the councils when participating in the early warning mechanism and the same EU 
draft legislative act can raise a harsh debate in a certain region while passing ignored in 
another. Thus, it is not convenient to force regional councils to agree on a common 
position within the Conference of their Presidents, thereby blocking the submission of 
regional observations in case of diverging views. Rather, as in other Member States like 
Austria (Kiefer 2010: 143-160; Weiss 2010: 97-106), Spain (Auzmendi del Solar 2010: 21-
28; Palomares Amat 2011: 19-58; Alonso de León 2012: 305-322) and the UK (Carter and 
McLeod 2005; Fasone 2009; Bruno 2012), the submission is conceived by Article 25 as an 
individual prerogative of every regional council, which in principle does not forbid them to 
adopt common observations within the Conference – being always informed by regional 
legislatures – and transmit them to the Parliament. This is a flexible solution which intends 
to simplify the procedure whenever possible: for instance, the top-down flow of 
information reaches the regional legislatures through their Conference, while the bottom-
up flow of information ensures the highest level of pluralism possible, allowing the 
expression of all regional positions unless a compromise amongst them is feasible. 
 
4.1. The ‘political dialogue’ 
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The most ‘revolutionary’ provisions of Law no. 234/2012 dealing with the relationship 
between regional councils and parliament in EU policy-making are those concerning the 
‘political dialogue’. This is a mechanism not regulated by the EU Treaties but invented by 
the European Commission in 2006, and confirmed in 2009, that enables national 
parliaments to directly transmit to the Commission any opinion or contribution on 
whatever EU draft legislative act or documents and raising any kind of concerns (on the 
legal basis, on the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality, or on the substance) outside 
the early warning mechanism and its deadline. The ‘political dialogue’ was actually 
conceived as a tool for legitimizing a direct channel between the Commission and 
parliaments to remedy the rigidity of the early warning mechanism, and in particular to 
broaden the focus of the scrutiny and to minimize time-constraints that could limit 
parliamentary participation. 
Indeed, as it is shown also by the European Commission, the ‘political dialogue’ has 
enhanced the position of parliaments in the EU constitutional architecture much more 
than the early warning mechanism (European Commission 2012: 4).XXVI Furthermore, the 
Italian Parliament has become one of the most active parliaments in this ‘political dialogue’ 
and thus it is not surprising that Law no. 234/2012 has regulated this fact, although it is 
quite a unique case in comparative perspective. 
In particular, the decision of the Italian legislator to include also regional councils into 
the ‘political dialogue’ is extremely important as regards the cooperation between national 
and regional legislatures. Italy is the only Member State to have adopted legal provisions 
which enable regional legislatures to participate in this EU mechanism. However, this does 
not mean that, outside of launching open consultations during pre-legislative stage (see 
above, section 1), regional councils are entitled to send their observations directly to the 
Commission, as the Italian chambers can (Article 9, section 1). Instead, the same 
mechanism that is in force between the national legislature and the Commission is now 
‘transplanted’ into the Italian Republic with regard to the relationship between regional 
councils and parliament. The submission of regional observations takes place under the 
same conditions as provided by Article 25 on the early warning mechanism, but the impact 
is more far-reaching in a twofold sense. 
First of all, since it has become evident that legislatures, as political bodies, are possibly 
not the best equipped institutions to accomplish a strictly legal scrutiny of the principle of 
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subsidiarity (Schütze 2009; Martinico 2011; contra Kiiver 2012), both national parliaments 
and regional assemblies are used to adopt opinions or contributions that also deal with the 
choice of the legal basis, the compliance with the principle of proportionality and, most of 
all, with the substance or the merit of a prospective measure, that also concern EU draft 
legislative acts falling within the exclusive competence of the Union (as it notably happened 
on the draft Regulation of the European citizens’ initiative) or simply EU documents, 
which sometimes are crucial (like the Annual Commission Work Programme). The 
‘political dialogue’ has anticipated such trends and Article 9 of Law no. 234/2012 has 
seconded it, creating a chain between regional, State and European institutions. Indeed, 
regional legislatures can now submit to the two chambers observations on any draft 
legislative act or document, on any ground, and in principle without a deadline, but of 
course respecting the parliamentary schedule, thus intervening before the opinions of 
parliament are transmitted to the Commission. In prospect, an interesting example could 
be that of the scrutiny of the Annual Commission Work Programme which, according to 
Article 13, section 1 of Law no. 234/2012, shall be examined jointly with the Annual 
Programme of the government on the future participation of Italy in EU affairs, and which 
are both transmitted to the regional councils through the Conference of their Presidents 
(Article 24 and Article 13, section 3).XXVII So by way of the (national) ‘political dialogue’, 
each regional council can now make its voice heard by parliament on both documents, thus 
submitting observations on the Annual Programme of the government in light of the 
Commission Work Programme (or vice versa), and identifying its own priorities also on EU 
legislative proposals, which is particularly important during the planning stage. Therefore, 
regional councils can have a say both at the national planning stage and, indirectly, also 
with regards to the EU planning stage, since their observations are taken into account by 
parliament when it transmit its opinions on the Commission Work Programme within the 
(European) ‘political dialogue’ (see infra). 
Secondly, the impact of the ‘political dialogue’ on regional councils is deeper if 
compared to the early warning mechanism because Article 9 expressly mandates parliament 
to take into consideration regional observations in its own opinions. Regional legislatures 
have been entitled to influence parliamentary procedures and to guide the content of 
parliamentary deliberations, at least when a residual or a shared competence of the regions 
was concerned. Therefore parliament is bound by regional observations, while again (see 
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above, section 4.1.) no specific limitations are posed upon regional councils as for the 
submission of observations to parliament, which can, in theory at least, pertain to any issue, 
no matter if it falls within the regional or the State remit. Although Article 9 marks a 
breakthrough with regard to the cooperation between national and regional legislatures – 
since, in principle, the observations of the latter can to some extent not be disregarded by 
the former – it is a paradox that such a result is achieved on a procedure which is not even 
provided by the Treaties, whereas the early warning mechanism, regarded as one of the 
main innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon (Kiiver 2012: 19 ff.),XXVIII according to Law no. 
234/2012, only limitedly strengthens the tie between the national and the regional 
legislatures. 
In spite of the significance of the provisions on the ‘parliamentary dialogue’ for 
regional councils, also in comparative perspective, Article 9 also contains an ambiguous 
and maybe erroneous reference to the ‘regions and autonomous provinces’, besides 
regional legislatures, as if the latter were not part of the regions themselves. The norm is 
actually meant to involve also regional executives into the ‘political dialogue’ with 
parliament, with the same binding effects as accorded to the observations submitted by the 
regional councils, and aims to increase the information flow from regional political bodies 
to the national legislature. However, this new provision once more demonstrates the 
‘regional blindness’ of the Italian state, which ignores how the early warning mechanism is 
designed at the regional level and how complicated the relationship between each regional 
legislature and executive is on this issue.XXIX Indeed, nowadays most regional laws that 
regulate this matter try to foster the adoption of a unitary position involving both the 
regional councils and the regional executives (Fasone 2010: 163-190). This happens either 
by means of a case-by-case inter-institutional agreement between the regional councils and 
the executive, which assigns to the council the power to submit observations – in particular 
on the principle of subsidiarity– on EU draft legislative acts to parliament and to the 
regional executive that to submit observations to the State government, thus establishing 
two parallel but consistent channels: one inter-parliamentary, the other inter-governmental. 
Or, as it is provided for in some other regions, like Marche, on the basis of a framework 
inter-institutional agreement it is the regional legislative Assembly that is entitled to adopt a 
position, also on behalf of the executive, which is then submitted to both the national 
parliament and government.XXX 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
144 
By contrast, as mentioned above (section 4.1.), these regional provisions and practices 
have been neglected by the national legislator, who has tried to establish procedures where 
there are multiple, confusing and overlapping interactions:  
- between the regional Ccuncils, on the one hand, and the regional executives, on the 
other, with the State executive, on potentially any issue arising from an EU proposal, 
within 30 days since its transmission;  
- between regional councils and the parliament, only on the compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity in the early warning mechanism and in due time, within the eight-
week period; and, finally,  
- between regional councils and regional executives, on the one hand, and the 
parliament, on the other, within the ‘political dialogue’, again in due time but considering 
the parliamentary schedule. 
These several procedures, instead of enhancing regional participation in shaping the 
national position on EU policies, could contribute to exacerbate tensions and to a deadlock 
within the regions on who, whether the council or the regional executive, is finally entitled 
to interact with the national parliament and the national government, as well as between 
the national legislature and the national executive, which to date have often acted 
independently from another on EU draft legislative acts (Esposito 2013: 41). Furthermore, 
despite the delayed adoption of Law no. 234/2012, it has ignored regional legislative 
provisions and practice in force for several years in order to arrange the most suitable 
regional institutional balance after the Treaty of Lisbon (since before regional participation 
in EU affairs was dominated by the executives) and it seems to complicate the inter-
institutional and multi-level relationships. 
 
5. In prospect: what else can strengthen the relationship between the 
Italian State and regional legislatures on EU matters? 
 
In spite of the expectations placed on Law no. 234/2012, this Law has missed the 
opportunity to define the relationship between regional councils and parliament as a long-
term and structured cooperation, inspired by the model of the early warning mechanism 
and potentially enforceable in many other circumstances dealing with Italian participation 
in EU affairs. Although it appears unlikely, from a political point of view, that Law no. 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
145 
234/2012, approved after a long parliamentary process and three years after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, will be substantially amended in the near future, in prospect 
some adjustments could be provided in order to establish a more direct and effective 
channel of interaction between the regional and the national legislatures. 
A first example of such an improvement consists in involving regional councils in the 
operation of the parliamentary scrutiny reserve, which gives parliament a guaranteed time-
frame – 30 days – to accomplish its scrutiny of an EU draft legislative act or document 
before any position is taken by the Italian Government in the Council of Ministers of the 
EU (Article 10). In particular, it could be provided that a scrutiny reserve, when activated 
by parliament, could be raised upon request of a minimum threshold of regional councils 
(e.g. at least one fourth, the same as the threshold for the early warning mechanism on 
criminal matters), if the issue at stake is of great concern for the region, if it affects the 
substance of a regional competence or if it compels crucial cross-regional interest. A 
regional scrutiny reserve is already in place and can be activated by the State-Regions 
Conference (Article 25, section 5). However, there only executives are represented and any 
direct relations between this body and parliament is inexistent. By contrast, the activation 
of the parliamentary scrutiny reserve upon a request of regional councils could also be 
convenient for parliament in order to understand how national legislative competences are 
affected by an EU measure. 
A similar input on the part of a consistent number of regional councils could also be 
provided with regards to the ex-post subsidiarity scrutiny, that is the procedure whereby 
one or both chambers can request the government to bring an action for annulment of a 
legislative act which is deemed to be inconsistent with the principle of subsidiarity before 
the Court of Justice of the EU (Article 8, Protocol no. 2, and Article 42, section 4, Law no. 
234/2012). The give such a role, which should concern just the initiation of the procedure 
without further binding parliament, to the regional councils seems coherent with the whole 
design of the ex-ante subsidiarity scrutiny, i.e. the participation of regional legislatures in 
the early warning mechanism by means of the consultation of parliament. In other words, 
since regional councils are entitled to step into the early warning mechanism, likewise they 
should be allowed to claim before parliament a violation of the principle of subsidiarity 
once the contested act, which violates regional legislative competences, has entered into 
force, although the decision to activate the procedure should lay firmly with parliament.XXXI  
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Finally, other examples of prospective provisions to be accommodated to the need of 
creating a more enduring relationship between national and regional legislatures are those 
concerning the involvement of the Italian Parliament in the simplified revision procedures 
of the EU Treaties – in particular, Article 48, sections 6 and 7 TEU, and Article 11, Law 
no. 234/2012 – and in the enforcement of the emergency brake mechanism (Article 12, 
Law no. 234/2012). Here both chambers are required to agree, either by way of a law or 
joint resolution. Given the impact of a Treaties revision on policies and policy-making in 
the long term and because, if it is simplified, it takes place without the solemn process of 
the ordinary revision procedure and of a proper national ratification, enhancing the 
participation of regions in the process at national level could contribute to making the 
revision more legitimate and shared. Each regional council could be allowed to send 
observations to parliament about the necessity of such a revision and its implications at 
regional level. The same procedure could apply in the event of an enforcement of the 
emergency brake procedure with regard to Article 48, section 2 TEU that deals with the 
adoption of measures by the European Parliament and the Council in the field of social 
security, particularly regarding the benefits of employed and self-employed workers and 
their dependants. Within this procedure each government in the Council can complain 
about an impairment of its social security system or its financial sustainability deriving from 
the measure proposed, thus suspending the procedure for its adoption. Consequently, 
Article 12 of Law no. 234/2012 entitles parliament to raise such an objection – the 
‘emergency brake’ – which then is binding for the Government in the Council. Since the 
measures adopted according to Article 48, section 2 TEU could produce a deep impact on 
social services provided within the regions as well as on their financial burdens, the 
possibility for regional councils to submit observations to parliament on whether the use of 
the emergency brake is suitable appears appropriate. 
In the end, fostering the tie between regional councils and parliament is not only 
convenient in terms of the protection of regional autonomy and competences, but it also 
improves the (democratic) quality of multi-level decision-making and provides parliament 
with information and observations – necessary for achieving a weighted decision – of 
which it would otherwise be devoid. 
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6. Conclusion. Will the early warning mechanism act as stimulus for a 
turn in the relationship between Italian legislatures? 
 
After decades of national uncertainty, the EU seems finally to have succeeded in 
establishing a direct and long-lasting relationship between the Italian parliament and 
regional councils by way of the early warning mechanism. In fact, in spite of the need to set 
up a stable cooperation between the national and regional legislatures, particularly after the 
extension of the legislative competences of the regions in 2001, Italy has failed to address 
this issue properly because of the lack of political agreement and willingness (section 2). 
The Treaty of Lisbon and its Protocol no. 2 (Article 6) provide for a first step in 
overcoming the lack of an enduring and institutionalized relationship amongst Italian 
assemblies. It is significant that the EU, the legal order traditionally accused to remain 
‘blind’ towards the regional or federal dimension of its Member States, is now likely to 
offer a first solution to the abovementioned problem: through the consultation of regional 
‘parliaments’ by the national legislature on the compliance of EU draft legislative acts with 
the principle of subsidiarity (section 1). Deprived of its long-standing ‘regional blindness’, 
since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU seems rather to be supporting – 
more or less consciously – the creation of an effective ‘multi-level parliamentary field’ 
(Crum and Fossum 2009: 249-271) even within Member States, as in Italy. 
However, in Italy the implementation of new EU provisions by the state level took a 
long time (contrary to what has happened at regional level, where several regional councils 
have proven to be quite active), in particular with regard to making the relationship 
between legislatures in the early warning mechanism effective, finally resulting in the 
adoption of Law no. 234/2012 on 27 November 2012 (section 3). Codifying the existing 
institutional practice with regards to inter-parliamentary relations, Art. 8 section 3 and Art. 
25 of the new Law have not introduced very innovative provisions on the national early 
warning mechanism, mainly deferring their detailed regulation to the parliamentary rules of 
procedure, a choice that can definitely be contested (section 4.1.): neither the effects nor 
the subjects of regional councils’ observations, nor the time-frame of the process, have 
been defined. A double-flow procedure is set up, whereby either the initiative for the 
consultation of regional councils can be taken by parliament (top-down), or the regional 
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councils themselves can activate the procedure and submit their observations to parliament 
(bottom-up). 
By contrast, the introduction of a ‘political dialogue’ between regional and national 
legislatures (Article 9, Law no. 234/2012), modeled on the European ‘political dialogue’ 
between national parliaments and the European Commission, appears ‘revolutionary’, also 
in comparative perspective (section 4.2.). Not only can regional councils send their 
observations to parliament on any EU draft legislative act or document, whatever the EU 
competence, but the two chambers are also bound to take them into consideration when 
adopting their opinions addressed to the European Commission. 
However, also this latter procedure raises some concerns, since it does not clarify the 
complex network of inter-institutional and multi-level relationships that should shape the 
position of the Italian Republic on EU affairs. Regardless of the institutional and legislative 
arrangements in force at regional level, which have been consolidated over the past few 
years, Law no. 234/2012 arguably also includes regional executives into the ‘political 
dialogue’ and thereby creates confusing and overlapping flows of information between 
governments and parliaments at national and regional level (section 4.2.). 
Although Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon could have foreseen an 
overall transformation of the national-regional legislatures relationship, starting from the 
provisions of its Article 6 on the early warning mechanism, Law no. 234/2012 has not 
exploited these norms in full and refrained from providing more effective and structured 
channels of inter-parliamentary cooperation. Inspired by what Protocol no. 2 states, the 
national legislator could have established further mechanisms of coordination between 
parliament and regional councils, for example with regards to the initiative for ex-post 
subsidiarity scrutiny before the Court of Justice of the EU, the activation of the 
parliamentary scrutiny reserve upon request of a certain number of regional councils, or 
parliamentary consultation of regional councils on provisions dealing with the simplified 
revision procedures of the Treaties or with the emergency brake. 
To conclude, the shift from the ‘regional blindness’ of the EU to the ‘regional 
blindness’ of Italy, as for regional participation in both the national parliamentary 
procedures in general and on EU affairs in particular, has only partially been recomposed 
by Law no. 234/2012, in spite of the potential impact of the Treaty of Lisbon, which could 
have provided an impetus for a more comprehensive reform of inter-parliamentary 
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relations in Italy– or rather, for its first introduction and proper regulation. However, 
possibly by way of institutional practice developed for the implementation of the national 
provisions on the early warning mechanism and on the ‘political dialogue’ as well as by way 
of further amendments to the Law, an effective inter-parliamentary cooperation, on EU 
inputs, will take place also in Italy and will expand beyond the EU related procedures, too.  
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its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community.’ 
IV See, in particular, the decision of the Court of First Instance (now General Court) on the case Regione 
autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission of the European Communities, of 15 June 1999, case T-288/97 [ECR 
II-01871], when the Court admitted for the first time an action for annulment brought against a decision of 
the Commission by a sub-State body. However, while the standards applied by the General Court for the 
recognition of a ‘regional direct concern’ are more flexible, to date the European Court of Justice has shown 
a more conservative approach (Caruso 2011). 
V According to Article 7, Protocol no 2, ‘Each national Parliament shall have two votes, shared on the basis 
of the national Parliamentary system. In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of the two 
chambers shall have one vote. Where reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act’s non-compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to the national Parliaments in 
accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the draft must be reviewed. This threshold shall be 
a quarter in the case of a draft legislative act submitted on the basis of Article 76 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union on the area of freedom, security and justice. After such review, the 
Commission or, where appropriate, the group of Member States, the European Parliament, the Court of 
Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank, if the draft legislative act originates 
from them, may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft. Reasons must be given for this decision’. 
Moreover, if the simple majority of the vote cast to parliaments is expressed by means of reasoned opinions 
before the beginning of the ordinary legislative procedure and if the Commission decides to maintain the 
proposal unmodified, then the Council, by a majority of 55% of its member, or the European Parliament, by 
a majority of the votes cast, can block the legislative process, considering such proposal in breach of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
VI Italy has 20 Regions (and 2 autonomous provinces): 5 of them were acknowledged by the Constitution 
itself and established in the aftermath of the adoption of the new Constitution. They enjoy a special status, 
meaning a greater fiscal autonomy and also broader legislative competences until 2001, usually because they 
are historical regions or because of the minorities living there. The remaining 15 Regions, instead, were 
established in the 1970s and where originally provided with less significant autonomy and legislative powers, 
although the constitutional reform of 2001 has significantly moved the position of the ordinary Regions 
closer to those having a special status. 
VII Perhaps the most notable attempt to create a ‘federal’ Senate or a Senate of the Regions in Italy was that 
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pursued by the Constitutional Law which intended to amend the Second Part of the Constitution, ‘Modifiche 
alla Parte II della Costituzione’, published on the Official Journal on 18 November 2005 (Gazzetta Ufficiale 
n. 269) and then rejected on the occasion of the constitutional referendum held on 25 and 26 June 2006. 
VIII In fact, nowadays Regions can legislate in all matters not expressly listed in Article 117 Const. (residual 
clause) and in those listed in section 3 of Article 117 Const., provided that the State fixes the fundamental 
principles of the subject-matter. By contrast, the State, in principle (since the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted the catalogue of competences aiming at broadening the scope of action of the State), can 
intervene strictly in the matters listed in section 2. Moreover before the constitutional revision of 2001 
regional laws must pass the preventive control of the State Government (former Article 127 Const.), which, 
under certain conditions, could challenge the constitutionality of the law before the Constitutional Court or 
the merit of the law before the State Parliament (although the latter procedure was never applied) 
(Gianfrancesco 1994). 
IX In the 16th Italian parliamentary term, 68 regional initiatives of national bills have been presented, 41 in the 
Chamber and 27 in the Senate (including those for amending the Statutes of the Regions enjoying special 
status), but only 5 of them (mostly constitutional law amending those special regional Statutes) have been 
enacted into law (source: websites of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, http://www.camera.it, and of the 
Senate, http://www.senato.it).  
X An example of a provision which has not been applied, although it would have enhanced the role of the 
Italian Regions in EU affairs, concerns the participation of members of regional governments in the national 
delegation to the Council of Ministers of the EU instead of State Ministers, when the draft legislative act to 
be examined falls in the within the regional remit (Paterniti 2012: 89-93). This can count as a further example 
of the ‘regional blindness’ of the State. 
XI Whose transmission has always been delayed by the Government with regard to the deadlines fixed by Law 
no. 11/2005, respectively, 31 December and 31 January. 
XII Article 15 of Law no. 11/2005 was entirely substituted by Article 8 of Law no. 96/2010, the annual 
Community Law for 2009, thus after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
XIII See the Report of the meeting of the Committee on Rules of the Chamber of Deputies held on 6 October 
2009 about the new procedures of cooperation between the Chamber and the EU institutions 
(www.camera.it) . 
XIV See the decisions adopted by the Committee on Rules of the Chamber of Deputies on 6 October 2009 
and on 14 July 2010, as well as the letter sent on the same day when the new Treaty entered into force, on 1 
December 2009, by the President of the Senate to the Chairmen of the standing committees. 
XV These are the cases of the two autonomous Provinces of Bolzano and Trento, of Calabria, Campania, 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lazio, and Piemonte. 
XVI See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of 
patients' rights in cross-border healthcare, COM (2008) 414 final, 2 July 2008, then become Directive 
2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011. The hearing of the councilor of the Assembly of Emilia-Romagna took place 
on 26 February 2009, as an informal hearing. From the adoption of the first decision by the Committee on 
Rules of the Chamber about the provisional procedure to be follow within the early warning mechanism, thus 
from 6 October 2009 onwards and until the revision of the Rules of procedure, regional councilors can be 
heard during this procedure according to Article 79, section 4, 5, and 6 on pre-legislative scrutiny. Therefore 
these hearings, if relying on these provisions can enjoy a higher level of publicity.  
XVII The term enhanced cooperation here is not used with the meaning it has according to Article 20 TEU, as 
a form of differentiated integration or of multi-speed Europe, but rather as a strengthened form of 
cooperation amongst all regional councils, with all of them agreeing on a common position. 
XVIII Of course those observations are currently transmitted also to the Government (in particular to the 
Minister on EU affairs and to the Permanent Representation of Italy at the EU), to the Conference of the 
Presidents of the Regions, and to the Committee of the Regions besides the Parliament. 
XIX See resolution of the Italian Senate, doc. XVIII-bis no. 65, of 8 May 2012, on a package of five draft 
Regulations, COM (2011) 610 def., COM (2011) 611 def., COM (2011) 612 def., COM (2011) 614 def., COM 
(2011) 615 def. 
XX Antonio Esposito (2013: 14) has underlined that Law no. 234/2012 aims at fostering the participation of 
Italy in the EU decision-making and in the implementation of EU as a system, that is inter-institutional 
coordination between the Parliament and the Government, between the Parliament and the Regional 
Councils, between Regions and local self-government and within the Executive itself. This standpoint is also 
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shared by Jens Woelk (2010: 11-24). 
XXI Indeed, when describing regional legislatures, Article 6 of Protocol no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon 
uses a formulation which has been banned by the Italian constitutional jurisprudence in two decisions (no. 
106 and no. 306 of 2002): Regional Councils cannot be assimilated, as for their nature, to the national 
legislature, which alone can be named as ‘Parliament’. It is not clear whether the formula ‘regional parliaments 
with legislative powers’ has been included in Protocol no. 2 following an inappropriate translation from the 
original French and English version of the Treaty (that refer to Parlements and Parliaments), or, rather, as it 
seems more plausible, no specific attention has been paid to the nomen used, since the distinctive features of 
this sub-national assemblies are substantially two: their inclusion within the regional level of government and 
the circumstance of being provided with legislative powers. By contrast, the formula used does not appear to 
design a ‘model’ of Parliament in the EU and to identify which these Parliaments are. 
XXII This statement, however, can find a reasonable explanation in the need to design the prospective 
procedure implementing the early warning mechanism by means of a fine-tuning of the initial procedure 
introduced provisionally and on a experimental basis. In other words, there was a need to test the procedure 
before it was codified. 
XXIII See further, section 4.2. 
XXIV According to Article 24, section 1, as soon as it receives them, the State Government transmits EU draft 
legislative acts and documents to the Conference of the Presidents of the Regional Councils (and to the 
Conference of the regional executives), which take care to forward them to very regional legislature. Thus, in 
the top-down procedure there is no direct flow of information between the Government and each Council. 
XXV Since 1 December 2009 (and even before, on the basis of a choice made by the European Commission in 
2006 and seconded by the European Council), national Parliaments have received all EU draft legislative acts 
and documents, thus they could easily forward them to the Regional Councils. 
XXVI The number of opinions sent by national Parliaments, according to the ‘political dialogue’ has increased 
of about 60%, from 387 in 2010 to 622 in 2011. 
XXVII Article 16 of Law no. 234/2012 adds a new document to be transmitted by the Government to the 
Regional Councils through the Conference of their Presidents (as well as to the Regional Executives through 
their Conference): the Report on the trend of the financial flow between Italy and the EU, which was already 
transmitted to the Parliament, according to Law no. 11/2005, and which contains very significant 
information for Regional Councils, for example on the incoming cohesion funds. 
XXVIII For the first time ever in 2012 the threshold of one third of reasoned opinions from national 
parliaments, sufficient for triggering the re-examination of an EU draft legislative act by the Commission, has 
been reached on the draft Regulation on the right to take collective action with regard to the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services in the EU (COM (2012) 130 final). In September 2012 the 
Commission decided to withdraw the proposal. See Russo (2012) and Fabbrini and Granat (2013: 115-144).  
XXIX I am grateful to Barbara Sardella for having raised this point to my attention. 
XXX The opposite solution, i.e. that of enabling the Regional Executive to adopt a binding position for the 
whole Region, also on behalf of the Council, which some Regions, like Campania (Article 2, regional law no. 
18/2008), still use, does not seem consistent with the new framework provided by EU law, in particular with 
the early warning mechanism where there is a direct call for the participation or regional legislatures. 
XXXI According to Article 8 of Protocol no. 2, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, an action for annulment on 
the same ground can be brought also by the Committee of the Regions (CoR), where Regional Councils are 
represented on the basis of Article 27 of Law no. 234/2012. However, the position of Regional Councils is 
quite different in the Committee of the Regions, compared to the status acquired in the early warning 
mechanism vis-à-vis the national Parliament. Indeed, within the CoR Italian Regional Councils are only a 
minor component, next to local self-government and regions from other EU Member States, the executives 
moreover being the largest component of the CoR. 
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